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Limiting Texas' Long-Arm Statute:
Walker v. Newgent
Texas, like many other states, has enacted a long-arm statute ex-
tending the state's jurisdictional powers as far as constitutionally permis-
sible.' This movement to extend the court's powers of process occurred
in response to increased trade relations between parties from widely sepa-
rated geographical locations. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reexamined the exact reach of the Texas long-arm statute. In
Walker v. Newgent 2 the court addressed the issue of whether a foreign
automobile manufacturer which sold cars to General Motors for retail
distribution in the United States could be deemed to be "doing business"
within the state, thus rendering it amenable to service of process. In its
opinion, the court reassessed traditional concepts of "doing business," the
nature of the parent-subsidiary corporate relationship, and the constitu-
tional reach of the state's long-arm statute in holding that the manufac-
turer was not amenable to service of process in Texas. This holding
reaffirms the notions that territorial boundaries do exist and that there
are limits to a long-arm statute's reach,3 especially in the context of inter-
national commercial transactions.
In the instant case, plaintiff Walker, a passenger in an Opel Rekord
automobile, was seriously injured in a collision in Germany in 1970 while
serving in the armed forces. Walker sued the driver of the car, Newgent,
for negligence, and eventually agreed to settle the case out of court.
Walker also brought a negligence action against General Motors and the
German manufacturer-distributor of the car, Adam Opel AG. The com-
plaint alleged defective manufacture of the windshield and breach of ex-
press and implied warranties. Service of process was sought under the
Texas long-arm statute on two theories. 4 First, Walker asserted jurisdic-
I See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon).
2 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
3 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
4 The applicable provision of article 2031b concerning service of process is as follows:
Sec. 1.
When any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company, partnership, or
non-resident natural person required by any Statute of this State to designate or
maintain a resident agent, or any such corporation, association, joint stock com-
pany, partnership, or non-resident natural person subject to section 3 of this Act,
has not appointed or maintained a designated agent, upon whom service of proc-
ess can be made, or has one or more resident agents and two (2) unsuccessful
attempts have been made on different business days to serve process upon each of
its designated agents, such corporation, . . . or non-resident natural personal
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tion against Opel in its capacity as manufacturer of the car. In the alter-
native, he asserted that Opel's tortious conduct in defectively
manufacturing the car could be imputed to GM by piercing Opel's cor-
porate veil and treating GM as Opel's alter ego. The district court re-
jected both of these approaches and granted Opel's motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction. Subsequently, it granted GM's motion for
summary judgment on grounds that GM had not manufactured or sold
the car in question, and that its degree of ownership and control did not
rise to the level necessary to impute to GM liability for acts of its subsidi-
ary Opel.
5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion on both motions. With regard to its motion to dismiss for want of
personal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit found that Opel had never main-
tained a place of business nor did it have any agents with sales responsi-
bilities in the United States.6 All Opel sales to its distributor, Buick,
were at a point outside the United States, at which time title passed to
Buick. Moreover, Opel sold only a small minority of its total car produc-
tion to Buick; the majority of its sales went to German and other Euro-
pean markets. 7 Finally, the car in question was not one of those sold for
export; it had been designed, manufactured, sold and operated in Ger-
many, where the accident occurred.8 Based on these facts, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that Opel's acts did not constitute "doing business" as
required by the Texas long-arm statute.9
The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the summary judgment order of the
trial court on the grounds that Opel was operated as an independent
corporation and that GM did not maintain sufficient control over Opel
to permit the court to impute Opel's conduct to GM. The court held
that the mere fact that GM owned 100% of Opel's stock was not suffi-
cient to pierce Opel's corporate veil.' 0
In the process of reaching its conclusions, the Fifth Circuit reexam-
ined the jurisdictional concept of "doing business." Historically, a state's
ability to assert jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations
was greatly limited, due mainly to Supreme Court dictum that "a corpo-
ration can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sover-
eignty by which it's created." I" The power of state courts was further
restricted by Pennoyer v. Neff,12 which deprived states of jurisdictional
shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Secretary of State of Texas
as their true and lawful attorney upon whom service of process or complaint may
be made.
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031(b)(1).
5 583 F.2d at 165.
6 Id. at 168.
7 Id. at 165.
8 Id. at 166.
9 Id. at 166-67.
10 Id. at 167.
1' Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
12 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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powers over persons not found within their geographical limits or who
did not owe their allegiance to the forum state. Due to the increase of
interstate and transcontinental business transactions, courts began to re-
alize such limited rules were not feasible and needed to be extended to
permit courts to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations that were
significantly involved in business within their forum. Several theories de-
veloped to justify these necessary assertions ofjurisdiction, although none
proved to be totally satisfactory. 13 First, courts used the legal fiction of
"consent," stating that because a corporation had engaged in activities
within the state, it had impliedly consented to subject itself to personal
jurisdiction. 14 Other courts held a corporation amenable to service of
process if it were engaged in business transactions within the state in a
way to warrant an inference of "presence."' 5 Judge Learned Hand
pointed out the circular definition of the presence theory by defining
presence as "such deals which will subject it to jurisdiction."' 16 Rejecting
the implied consent and presence theories as unworkable, some courts
adopted a "doing business" approach. Despite the fact that this test
found much popularity as a measure of the court's power over foreign
corporations, 17 critics of the doing business test maintained that it was
basically a merger of the implied consent and presence theories of juris-
diction.
In the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v Washington,' 8 the
Supreme Court rejected all three of these tests and established the mod-
ern standard for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The
Court required the defendant to "have certain minimum contacts with
the state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."' 19 Strictly interpreting this test
in Hanson v. Denckla, 20 the Supreme Court held that states were not au-
thorized to exercise in personam jurisdiction where the defendant did not
solicit business in the forum nor purposefully avail itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the state. The Court thus reaffirmed the
vital concept of territorial limitations on state powers of process. No
matter how minimal the burden on a defendant to appear in the forum,
he may not be required to do so unless the prerequisite minimum con-
tacts exist. 2 1
Plaintiff in the instant case predicated the existence of personal ju-
risdiction over Opel on the Texas long-arm statute, which includes the
13 See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In PersonamJunsdiction of the
State Cours-From Pennoyer to Denckha" A Review, 25 U. CH. L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958).
'4 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855).
15 Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
16 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
17 See Kurland, supra note 13, at 584.
18 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19 Id. at 316.
20 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
21 Id. at 251.
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"doing business" phrase as a measure of amenability to suit, but clarifies
the concept somewhat by specifying particular situations in which one
will be seen as "doing business." For example, entering a contract with a
Texas resident or committing a tortious act within the state constitutes
"doing business" under the statute. 22 In addition, the statute includes a
catch-all clause that states "including other acts that may constitute do-
ing business." This clause has been interpreted as an expansion of the
statute to its constitutional limits. 23
In Walker the Fifth Circuit examined whether Opel was doing busi-
ness under either the tort, contract or catch-all clauses of the statute.
When examining either the tort or contract clause, the court, under Inter-
national Shoe, must first examine whether the statute reaches defendant's
conduct. 24 If it does, the court must then determine whether the asser-
tion of jurisdiction is violative of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 25 The catch-all clause is easier to apply since it expands the stat-
ute to its constitutional limits. 26 When applying the catch-all clause, the
court need only determine whether such assertion of jurisdiction is com-
patible with due process. Why the Fifth Circuit and other Texas courts
continue to employ the tort and contract clauses rather than simply
resorting to the catch-all clause is unclear. Exclusive use of the catch-all
clause would eliminate the need to employ the first prong of the Interna-
tional Shoe two-part test and thus facilitate application of the statute.
Whatever the court's reason for examining all three aspects of the stat-
ute, it is clear that the tort and contract provisions of the statute did not
reach defendant's activities. Moreover, jurisdiction may not be founded
on the catch-all clause because defendant lacks the requisite minimum
contacts with the forum under Internattonal Shoe.
Turning first to the statute's tort provision, the Fifth Circuit found
that jurisdictional power may be properly asserted if a defendant com-
mits a tort in whole or in part in the state of Texas. A literal interpreta-
tion of this test would lead to an immediate dismissal of the instant case
because the tortious act (either the accident or defective manufacture of
the car) occurred in Germany. The instant case must be distinguished
from "stream of commerce" cases27 where courts have asserted jurisdic-
22 The "doing business" section of article 2031b provides:
Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that may
constitute doing business, any . . . non-resident natural person shall be deemed
doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State,
or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State.
23 See Thode, In PersonamJun dictzn." Article 2031b, the Texas "Long-Arm"Jursdiition Statute,
and the Appearance to ChallengeJursdtction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEx. L. REV. 279, 307 (1964).
24 See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, _ Tex. _, 544 S.W.2d 500 (Ct. App. 1976),
aj'd, 553 S.W.2d 760 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
25 Id. at 502.
26 See Thode, supra note 23, at 307-08.
27 See, e.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Coulter v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
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tion over manufacturers who produce defective goods and place them
into service in distant states. Courts have consistently held that when a
manufacturer distributes goods that it knows or has reason to know will
be distributed in the state where the injury occurs, it may be amenable to
process in that forum.28 The operative conditions involved are: one,
that the defendant foreign corporation has elected to engage in wide-
spread economic activity; two, that its acts are deliberate and not fortui-
tous; and three, that it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant will
need to invoke the law of the state where its product might cause in-
jury.29
An important Texas case employing the stream of commerce ration-
ale is Eyery Aircraft Co. v. Kilh'an.30 In Eyerly, plaintiff was injured on an
amusement park ride manufactured by the defendant Oregon corpora-
tion. Plaintiff brought suit in Texas where the accident occurred. In
upholding jurisdiction, the court stated that even though defendant had
never entered Texas, he had reason to know that the ride would be
brought into the state, and that this knowledge was sufficient to maintain
jurisdiction. 3' Similarly, in Coulterv. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 32 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a nonresident television manufacturer who had sold goods
to a retailer over an extended period of time and knew that a portion of
its products would be shipped to Texas for resale could be subjected to
personal jurisdiction. Citing Eyerl'y as precedent, the court stated that
the defendant had established a pattern of distribution over a period of
time and that this pattern constituted geographic foreseeability.3 3
Hence, these two cases are distinguishable from the instant case because
they involved goods which the manufacturers could foresee reaching the
forum state and accidents the manufacturers could foresee happening
within the forum state.
Two Texas courts that reviewed accidents occurring outside the
state declined to assert jurisdiction under the tort clause of the statute.
In Odom v. Thomas34 plaintiff brought an action in Texas against an Ala-
bama interstate trucking corporation for a collision that occurred in Ar-
kansas. The complaint alleged a simple tort, rather than a products
liability claim, and consequently the district court decided it was best
adjudicated in the state where the accident occurred. Likewise, in Reich
o. Signal Oil & Gas Co. ,35 the Fifth Circuit held that an action could not
be brought in Texas for a tort claim arising from a helicopter crash in
28 Jetco Electric Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973). But see World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 48 U.S.L.W. 4079 (1980).
29 See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
30 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
31 Id. at 596.
32 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
33 The court stated: "[Defendant] unquestionably knew that its products were being regu-
larly marketed in Texas." Id. at 1318.
34 338 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
35 409 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1974), af'd, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Ghana. The court found insufficient connections with the state of Texas
for jurisdictional purposes since the helicopter was owned by a British
corporation, and its Italian manufacturer had merely introduced it into
the stream of international commerce. In noting that due process was
not satisfied here because the helicopter was never put into service in the
United States, the court implicitly found that had it been placed into the
United States' stream of commerce, jurisdiction might have been appro-
priate. 36 The Opel Rekord in the instant case, however, was neither in-
troduced into international commerce nor put into service in the United
States. It was manufactured, sold and used exclusively in Germany.
One Texas federal district court, under rather unique circumstances,
did uphold jurisdiction for a tortious activity which did not occur in
Texas. In Wiliams v. Brasea, Inc. ,37 the defendant Alabama corporation
sold approximately forty fishing vessels to Texas residents knowing they
would be operated out of Texas ports. The accident, in which plaintiff
was injured when a winch was activated while his hands were entangled
in the line, occurred in international waters off the Texas coast. The
Odom court distinguished this case as upholding jurisdiction over an acci-
dent that took place in international waters, as opposed to a foreign state
or country, because jurisdiction was most logical in the state nearest
where the accident occurred.3 8 Moreover, on its facts, Wiliams is closely
related to the E}yerly line of stream of commerce cases. The fishing vessels
in Wihiams were sold to Texas residents and used in Texas, while the car
in the instant case was neither sold nor operated in Texas. Consequently,
the Fifth Circuit rejected Williams as precedent for asserting jurisdiction
over Opel in the instant case and concluded that the defendant's activity
did not satisfy the tort provision of the Texas long-arm statute.
Next, the court rejected any notion that jurisdiction could be predi-
cated on the contract portion of the Texas statute. It noted that to ob-
tain jurisdiction under this clause the plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing that a contract existed between the parties and that it was per-
formed at least partially in Texas. 39 Since the record revealed no evi-
dence of the existence of any contract, the court ruled this portion of the
statute inapplicable. 4°
Finally, after rejecting the tort and contract theories as a basis for
asserting jurisdiction, the court addressed plaintiffs contention that the
Texas long-arm statute reached defendant's conduct because the statute
extended the power of jurisdiction to the limits of due process. The Fifth
Circuit examined the standards that have emerged from the decisions of
Texas courts for determining jurisdictional authority under the mini-
36 Id. at 850.
37 320 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
38 338 F. Supp. at 879.
39 See 495 F.2d at 491.
40 583 F.2d at 166.
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mum contacts test. 4 1 The District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, in Lone Star Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp. ,42 stated that the
factors it would consider included: "[the] nature and character of [the
defendant's] business . . . , [the] number and type of acts within the fo-
rum . . . , whether such acts give rise to the cause of action .. .,
whether the forum has a special interest in granting relief... ,[and the]
relative convenience of the parties."' 43 Similarly, the Texas Supreme
Court in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 44 recognized three elements that must exist
in order to uphold jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:
(1) The non-resident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully
do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the
cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or trans-
action; [and] (3) the assumption ofjurisdiction by the forum state must
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice .... 45
The restrictivenesss of this test, which requires the cause of action to be
connected with an act or transaction occurring in the forum, makes it
impossible to uphold jurisdiction in the instant case since the accident
was totally unrelated to the forum.
Another variation of the test for due process was formulated in Prod-
uct Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,4 6 where the Fifth Circuit determined that
there must be some minimum contact with the state which results from
an "affirmative act" of the defendant, and that it must be fair and rea-
sonable to require the defendant to come into the state to defend the
action. This test is more liberal than its predecessors in not requiring the
cause of action to arise from the same acts which form the basis for the
defendant's contacts with the forum. However, defendant's conduct in
the instant case did not satisfy the Product Promotions test because all of
defendant's affirmative acts occurred in Germany, and "unilateral activ-
ity by the plaintiff cannot produce the minimum contacts necessary to
satisfy due process"'47 without some act on defendant's part.
Concluding that Opel's activity did not fulfill the requirements of
either the contract, tort or catch-all clauses of the Texas long-arm stat-
ute, the fifth circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Opel for
want of personal jurisdiction. 48 The fifth circuit then examined the trial
court's summary judgment order and plaintiff's assertion that jurisdic-
tion could be based on the relationship between Opel and General Mo-
tors, which admittedly was doing business within the forum. If the court
41 For a discussion of the minimum contacts standards of the Texas courts, see Nelson,
Long-AnrmJurisiction: Rule 108 as an ,4lternatve to "'Doztg Business" under Artile 2031b, 30 BAYLOR
L. REV. 99, 102 (1978).
42 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
43 Id. at 56.
44 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
45 Id. at 342 (quoting Tyee Const. Co. v. Pulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 115,
381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963)).
46 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
47 Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1268 (5th Cir. 1978).
48 583 F.2d at 168.
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determined that the status of the parent corporation, General Motors,
could be imputed to the subsidiary, Opel, appropriate jurisdictional
grounds would be found.49 However, before the corporate fiction could
be disregarded and the subsidiary subjected to process as the parent's
"alter ego," plaintiff had to prove that the subsidiary corporation was
simply a guise under which the parent conducted business. 50
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Bay Sound
Transport Co. v. United States,51 listed a number of factors 52 to be consid-
ered in determining whether a subsidiary is a mere instrumentaility of
the parent corporation. These factors include common stock ownership;
common directors, and specific instances in which a parent exercises such
control as to make the subsidiary a mere instrumentality. 53 Other states
have developed similar requirements to establish the alter ego relation-
ship. Under California law, it must be shown that there is such a unity
of interest that individuality and separateness of the two corporations
have ceased and that adherence to the fiction of a separate corporate
existence would promote injustice or further a fraud. 54 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit cited a Florida Supreme Court case holding that:
Those who utilize the laws of this state in order to do business in the
corporate forum have every right to rely on the rules of law which pro-
tect them against personal liability unless it can be shown that the cor-
poration is formed or used for some illegal, fraudulent or other unjust
purpose which justifies piercing of the corporate veil. 55
No illegal or fraudulent motive was alleged in the instant case, and
the only factor that tended to show parent control was GM's ownership
of 100% of Opel's stock. However, numerous cases have established that
this fact alone is insufficient to create an agency relationship. 56 For ex-
ample, in Reul v. Sahara Hotel,57 the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas held that a parent's ownership of 100% of its subsidiary's
stock and the presence of directors in the forum were not sufficient to
pierce the corporate veil. Similarly, in Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama,
49 See Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995, 997 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
50 See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975).
51 350 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
52 The complete list of factors includes:
(1) common stock ownership; (2) common directors or officers; (3) financing of
the subsidiary by the parent; (4) the incorporation of the subsidiary being caused
by the parent; (5) grossly inadequate capital for the subsidiary; (6) payment by
the parent of the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary; (7) the
subsidiary receiving no business except that given to it by the parent; (8) the
parent using the subsidiary's property as its own, and; (9) the directors or officers
of the subsidiary acting independently in the interest of the subsidiary but taking
their orders from the parent in the latter's interest.
Id. at 426.
53 Id.
54 Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d
802, 807 (1958).
55 Robert's Fish Farm v. Spencer, 53 S.2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1963).
56 See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Turner v. Jack
Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).
57 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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Ltd ,58 an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff at defend-
ant's hotel in the Bahamas, the Fifth Circuit found insufficient connec-
tions to fuse the parent and subsidiary corporations even though the
defendant corporation solicited business, held management conferences,
and owned common stock with the forum corporation.
59
In light of these holdings, it would appear that in the instant case
Opel's activities did not reach the level necessary to impute GM's busi-
ness to Opel. No facts sufficient to make a prima facie case of actual
control by GM over Opel were shown. The two corporations did not
share corporate offices, registered agents, or have mutual officers and di-
rectors. 60 Opel maintained its own operations and functioned indepen-
dently of GM. In fact, the only bonds between the two were the 100%
stock ownership by GM previously mentioned and the customer-manu-
facturer trade relationship. Moreover, even this relationship was not ex-
tensive; at most, only elevent percent of Opel's total output was ever sold
to GM in any year.6 ' In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp. ,62 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York noted that while corporate
"control" is hard to define, it includes considerable patronage and the
power to direct corporate policy.6 3 The supplier in that case provided
GM with thirteen to twenty-four percent of its requirements; however,
these percentages were found to be insufficient to constitute "considera-
ble patronage." 64 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit apparently found that a
total of eleven percent of Opel's sales to GM was insufficient and af-
firmed the district court's summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Walker v. Newgent is supported by
strong policy considerations. Were the court to hold Opel, a foreign cor-
poration with very slight contacts with the United States, amenable to
service of process, foreign countries using American goods obtained
through somewhat indirect means might require U.S. corporations to ap-
pear in their courts to adjudicate products liability claims. This result
would defeat the purposes served by permitting enterprises to segregate
their activities as they extend into less developed countries. Indeed,
"harmful extensions of the doctrine in this area will easily lend them-
selves to reciprocal manipulation against American enterprises operating
through subsidiaries or affiliates in other countries,"'65 with possibly sti-
fling effects on international trade relations if carried to an extreme. In
Walker the Fifth Circuit recognized that a limit must be placed on states'
58 353 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1965).
59 Id. at 956.
60 583 F.2d at 167.
61 Id.
62 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afd, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 911 (1971).
63 Id. at 367.
64 Id. at 381.
65 See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 546, 227 N.E.2d 851, 859,
N.Y.S.2d 41, 52 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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jurisdictional powers in order to promote international trade and pre-
serve the integrity of the due process clause.
In addition to promoting international trade, the court's decision in
Walker eliminates the problem of forum shopping. Plaintiff's suit had no
rational nexus with Texas. Opel's activities were confined to Germany
and had no foreseeable effects in Texas because the automobile in ques-
tion was sold for exclusive use in Germany. As a matter of fact, all of the
activity in the case-the manufacture of the car, the sale of the car, and
the accident itself--occurred in Germany. It was the court's conclusion
that the only reason plaintiff brought suit in Texas was that he subse-
quently came to reside there,66 certainly insufficient grounds alone to
justify an assertion of jurisdiction. The court wisely decided that these
policy considerations were more significant than plaintiff's convenience
and refused to allow the plaintiff to maintain his suit in Texas.
-KATHLEEN T. WEAVER
66 583 F.2d at 168.
